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Abstract
We explore the relation between management forecasts and analyst forecasts to determine whether a
moderating role exists for credibility. Two types of credibility are examined: management credibility and
analyst credibility. Management credibility is evaluated by management's forecasting ability (based upon prior
forecast outcomes) and the firm's underlying Corporate Governance (CG) structure. Analyst credibility is
assessed by their forecasting ability only, based upon prior forecast outcomes. Two questions are addressed by
this study: (1) does management credibility moderate the relation between management's initial forecasts and
initial analyst forecasts? and, (2) is the relation between analyst forecasts and subsequent management




Aman, H., Beekes, W., Chang, M. & Wee, M. (2019). The role of credibility in the relation between
management forecasts and analyst forecasts in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 55 29-45.
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/1536
1 
 
The role of credibility in the relation between management forecasts and analyst 1 
forecasts in Japan 2 
 3 
1 Introduction 4 
We explore the relation between management forecasts and analyst forecasts to determine 5 
whether a moderating role exists for credibility. Two types of credibility are examined: 6 
management credibility and analyst credibility. Management credibility is evaluated by 7 
management’s forecasting ability (based upon prior forecast outcomes) and the firm’s 8 
underlying Corporate Governance (CG) structure. Analyst credibility is assessed by their 9 
forecasting ability only, based upon prior forecast outcomes. Two questions are addressed by 10 
this study: (1) does management credibility moderate the relation between management’s 11 
initial forecasts and initial analyst forecasts? and, (2) is the relation between analyst forecasts 12 
and subsequent management forecast revisions moderated by analyst credibility?  13 
In Japan, management forecasts for the following year’s earnings are effectively 14 
mandatory.  These management forecasts are disclosed at the same time as the annual earnings 15 
announcement and analyst forecasts follow shortly thereafter. Management forecasts can 16 
reduce information asymmetry between managers and those outside the firm, and are likely to 17 
be an important source of information for analysts, particularly at the start of the fiscal year 18 
when few alternative sources of performance information are available (Ota, 2011).  In this 19 
study, we differentiate the first (initial) forecasts of the financial year for both analysts and 20 
management from their subsequent forecasts.  21 
Managers have incentives to bias their forecasts (Rogers and Stocken, 2005). Therefore, 22 
we posit that perceptions of management’s competence and trustworthiness, and the firm’s CG 23 
structure (two aspects of management credibility) influence perceptions of management 24 
credibility. This in turn impacts analysts’ reliance on the information in management forecasts 25 
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when making their own forecasts of future firm performance.1 Specifically, we investigate the 26 
moderating role of management credibility on the relation between management and analyst 27 
forecasts. 28 
Although managers are generally thought of as having an information advantage about the 29 
performance of the firm, in some firms performance is heavily influenced by external economic 30 
factors which are outside managers’ control. Also analysts have access to detailed 31 
macroeconomic information which is not readily available to managers. As a consequence, 32 
analysts potentially have an information advantage over managers in predicting future firm 33 
performance. In these circumstances management forecasts can be less accurate than those of 34 
financial analysts (Hutton et al., 2012), and managers may use the information in analyst 35 
earnings forecasts to inform their own forecast revisions. Accordingly, we expect analyst 36 
credibility to play a role in affecting the level of reliance that managers place on information 37 
contained in analyst forecasts, thus moderating the relation between analyst forecasts and 38 
management forecast revisions. 39 
Japan has a comparatively low level of litigation relative to countries like the US (Ginsburg 40 
and Hoetker, 2006). Therefore Japanese managers are unlikely to face substantial legal costs if 41 
they provide biased forecasts although they may bear reputational costs from so doing. 2 42 
Although much prior work has investigated voluntary management forecast disclosures for US 43 
                                                          
 
1 We examine the analyst forecasts of next period earnings that are made available immediately after the release 
of the current year annual summary report, to examine how analysts respond to the initial management forecast 
released with the annual summary report. 
2 Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that Kato et al. (2009) find evidence of optimism in managers’ initial 
earnings forecasts. Nonetheless this initial optimism is managed downwards through subsequent forecast revisions 
later in the financial year (Aguilera et al., 2017). Potential motives for the managerial optimism in initial earnings 
forecasts in Japan include managers’ inherent over-confidence in their ability (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), 
excessive reliance on superior past performance in making future forecasts (Lakonishok et al., 1994), as well as a 
desire to demonstrate to stakeholders that they are doing a good job.  
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firms, few studies focus specifically on management disclosures in Japan. Notable exceptions 44 
include Aguilera et al. (2017), Iwasaki et al. (2016), Kato et al. (2009), and Ota (2010, 2011).  45 
Iwasaki et al. (2016) show that management’s earnings forecasts are managed to avoid negative 46 
forecast innovations and that the market rewards firms for doing so.3 However, prior work 47 
finds forecast optimism is more likely in smaller firms, firms with poor performance and those 48 
experiencing financial distress (Kato et al., 2009; Ota, 2011). 49 
In contrast to the US, the extent and timing of management forecast disclosures in Japan is 50 
specified in legal and stock exchange regulations. The Financial Instruments and Exchange 51 
Law requires firms to file their annual reports within three months of the firm’s  52 
year-end, but the stock exchanges in Japan require timely disclosure under the securities listing 53 
regulations [Part 2, Chapter 4, Section 2]. Management’s initial forecasts of next year’s 54 
expected ordinary income, net income and sales are released alongside the announcement of 55 
this year’s actual earnings, which usually occurs “25-40 trading days after fiscal year end,” 56 
(Ota, 2011, p.1319). Firms are required to issue revised forecasts where the forecast changes 57 
by ±10% for sales and ±30% for ordinary income/net income (Kato et al., 2009, p. 1577). 58 
Therefore firms are obliged to ensure that updates to forecasts are made on a timely basis. 59 
We use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to determine relations between management 60 
and analyst forecasts, with data from firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 61 
Exchange (TSE). SEM is a powerful tool for modelling complex relationships among observed 62 
variables and latent constructs. Latent constructs are unobservable and are represented by 63 
multiple observed variables. These constructs may be endogenous, like the dependent variable 64 
in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, or exogenous, which means they are 65 
determined by factors external to the model (Hair et al., 2010). While SEM has not been widely 66 
                                                          
 
3 Forecast innovation is defined as the expected improvement (or decline) in next year’s earnings relative to the 
current year’s reported earnings. 
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used in the accounting and finance literature to date, it has been used to operationalise different 67 
measures of CG (see for example, Daily et al., 1999). It has also been used to capture the impact 68 
of the complementary and substitution roles of CG on CEO compensation in Taiwanese firms 69 
(Lin, 2005) and company performance in Australian firms (Azim, 2012). SEM has also been 70 
used in Landsman et al. (2012) to investigate whether the introduction of International 71 
Financial Reporting Standards has resulted in greater information content in company earnings 72 
announcements (as proxied by abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume). 73 
In summary, our results indicate that management credibility moderates the relation 74 
between management initial forecasts for the year and subsequent analyst forecasts. More 75 
specifically, the reliance that analysts place on management forecasts increases with the level 76 
of management credibility. Our SEM analysis also shows a moderating role for analyst 77 
credibility in the relation between analyst forecasts and management forecast revisions. When 78 
revising their forecast, the level of reliance that management places on analyst forecasts 79 
increases with analyst credibility.  80 
In additional analysis, we examine the mediating role of management and analyst 81 
credibility. The results show that management’s initial forecast has a direct effect on analyst 82 
forecasts but there is no indirect effect through management credibility. Similarly, the SEM 83 
analysis shows analyst forecasts having a direct effect on management forecast revisions 84 
although no indirect effect exists through analyst credibility. 85 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, earlier 86 
studies have not considered the role of analyst forecasts (and their associated credibility) in 87 
informing management forecast revisions. For firms whose performance is heavily affected by 88 
external economic factors, the credibility of financial analysts is likely to be an important factor 89 
influencing whether managers use analyst forecasts to inform their own forecast revisions. 90 
Second, we model the relation between management and analyst forecasts in a SEM framework 91 
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and include management credibility and analyst credibility separately as moderating factors. 92 
Credibility has not been considered by prior studies in this way previously although source 93 
credibility is known to influence forecast reliance (Mercer, 2004). Third, we use latent 94 
variables in SEM to measure credibility, an unobservable variable. Management credibility is 95 
shown by observable factors indicating prior forecast ability including optimism, accuracy, 96 
consistency and earnings surprise, and firm CG. Similarly, the unobservable analyst credibility 97 
is proxied by factors indicating previous forecasting accuracy, optimism and dispersion. While 98 
other studies examine the effects of these forecasting factors individually, we consider these 99 
together synergistically in a SEM model. 100 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 101 
and develops the hypotheses, Section 3 discusses the data and sample, while Section 4 outlines 102 
the research method. Section 5 contains the results from our main analysis and Section 6 103 
presents additional results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 104 
 105 
2 Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 106 
2.1 Analyst Reliance on Management Forecasts 107 
Managers have expert knowledge of their business, its strategy and operations and therefore 108 
are in a good position to predict future firm performance. However, management forecast 109 
accuracy will depend upon the level of firm complexity, the volatility of earnings, the quality 110 
of accounting information systems, as well as the managers’ competence at forecasting. Even 111 
if management have a clear idea of the firm’s likely performance, they may choose to bias the 112 
forecast depending on incentives, the ability of the market to detect such biases and the 113 
potential threat of litigation (Rogers and Stocken, 2005). Prior evidence indicates Japanese 114 
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managers’ initial earnings forecasts tend to be optimistic (Kato et al., 2009; Aguilera et al., 115 
2017) although subsequent forecasts are revised downward throughout the year.4  116 
The relation between management and analysts’ forecasts is likely to depend on the 117 
credibility of disclosures. If management disclosures are not perceived to be credible, there 118 
may be very low correlation between management and analysts’ forecasts. Prior research 119 
identifies that manager’s negative or “bad news” disclosures are inherently more credible 120 
(Williams, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003) as managers prefer to avoid disclosures which may 121 
adversely affect debt contracts or compensation arrangements. For example, Skinner (1994) 122 
shows that the stock price response is greater for “bad news” than “good news” in forecasts. 123 
Also, disclosures from firms in financial distress are perceived as less credible (Koch, 2002) 124 
as managers have incentives to mislead. The characteristics of the disclosure itself, such as the 125 
precision of the forecast, the time horizon of the forecast, the amount of additional supporting 126 
information disclosed (Hirst et al., 2007; Hutton et al., 2003) and the overall plausibility of the 127 
disclosure (Williams, 1996; Hansen and Noe, 1998; Koch, 2002) are also important. 128 
Disclosures which are more precise, with a shorter time horizon (i.e., the timing of the 129 
disclosure is nearer to the release date of the annual earnings) and include additional supporting 130 
information relating to sales or other items increase the disclosure’s credibility. 131 
In addition to the actual disclosure, management’s credibility is important in how analysts 132 
react to “news” contained in management forecasts. Perceptions of management credibility are 133 
based upon managers’ prior forecasting behaviour, i.e., the reputation which managers have 134 
built up over time in forecasting (Mercer, 2004; Hutton and Stocken, 2009). Managers which 135 
                                                          
 
4 Many reasons have been put forward for this behaviour including: the low litigation environment in Japan, the 
existence of corporate groupings (keiretsu) and the private transfer of information within the corporate group, to 
avoid reporting a loss (Cho et al., 2011),  or to motivate the workforce in a policy of continuous improvement 
(Kato et al., 2009). Alternatively, managers may over-estimate returns from their investments because of over-
confidence in their ability (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) or underweighting of overall industry performance on the 
firm’s individual performance. 
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release more accurate prior forecasts are viewed as more credible (Williams, 1996; Hirst et al., 136 
1999; Ng et al., 2013; Yang, 2012). Therefore, current year forecasts are perceived as less 137 
credible where persistent biases are evident in forecasting. The level of external and internal 138 
assurance of financial reporting is also likely to impact the assessment of management 139 
credibility. Prior evidence shows monitoring provided by CG is positively associated with both 140 
the frequency and accuracy of earnings forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Byard et al., 141 
2006) and forecast revisions (Nagata and Nguyen, 2017). CG is also negatively associated with 142 
earnings management (Klein 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005).5 Therefore managers of firms with 143 
better CG structures could be perceived as more credible. 144 
In this study, we examine the effect of the initial management forecast of earnings on 145 
analysts’ first mean consensus forecast of earnings for the year. It is rational for analysts to rely 146 
on management forecasts when making their own forecasts if they believe the forecasts to be 147 
credible. This approach extends the work initiated by Ball and Brown (1968), by examining 148 
the effects of credibility on the relationship between analyst response and earnings expectation. 149 
The reliance that analysts place on information contained in the management forecast when 150 
formulating their own forecasts is expected to be greater where management forecasts are more 151 
credible (either due to management’s prior forecasting ability or firm’s CG). Specifically, we 152 
test the following hypothesis: 153 
H1: Management credibility moderates analysts’ reliance on management forecasts. 154 
 155 
2.2 Management’s Reliance on Analyst Forecasts 156 
Managers possess private information regarding the firm’s underlying performance and are 157 
often perceived as having an informational advantage over analysts. However, analysts have 158 
                                                          
 
5 Despite the differing CG structures in Japan, the 2015 TSE CG principle 3 clearly indicate a relation between 
CG and timely disclosures, and the board of directors’ role in monitoring disclosure (TSE, 2015). 
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more experience predicting future economic conditions and may be able to objectively assess 159 
a firm’s competitive position and prospects (Hutton et al., 2012). Therefore, where a firm’s 160 
performance is predominantly influenced by external economic factors, outside of the control 161 
of management, analysts may more accurately predict firm’s future performance. In such 162 
situations, where managers have previously found it difficult to forecast earnings accurately 163 
(and analyst forecasts have been more accurate), it is possible that managers use analysts’ 164 
forecasts to inform their own current year earnings forecast. If analysts’ forecasts are perceived 165 
to be credible, we anticipate management place greater reliance upon the information in analyst 166 
forecasts when making revisions to their own current year earnings forecast.  167 
Previous research indicates that analyst forecast credibility is related to (and in our study 168 
proxied by) the forecasting track record of the analysts. Forecast accuracy is measured by the 169 
closeness of the analyst forecast to actual earnings (Kadous et al., 2009).6 Analyst forecasts 170 
that are more accurate in the previous year are perceived as more credible. Keung (2010) shows 171 
that the inclusion of supplementary information, such as sales forecast revisions at the same 172 
time as earnings forecast revisions, may enhance forecast’s credibility. The additional 173 
information provided by the analysts may have the benefit of increasing forecast credibility, 174 
since investors can use the information to gauge the knowledge of the analysts. Hilary and Hsu 175 
(2013) show that forecasts made by analysts with more consistent forecast errors have a greater 176 
effect on prices and the consistency in forecast errors has a larger effect than current forecast 177 
accuracy. We test the importance of financial analyst credibility in influencing manager’s use 178 
of consensus analyst forecasts to inform their own forecast revisions. 179 
H2: Analyst credibility moderates management’s reliance on analyst forecasts when 180 
they make forecast revisions. 181 
                                                          
 




3 Data & Sample  183 
3.1 Data Sources 184 
The financial accounting data and management forecast data is taken from the Nikkei 185 
Financial Quest (FQ) database. Analyst data is taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimates 186 
System (I/B/E/S) database. We use one year ahead analyst and management forecasts in this 187 
study which are announced at the start of the fiscal year. We also collect data on management 188 
forecast revisions. An issue with merging the two databases is the inconsistency in the 189 
denomination used in the reporting of the earnings data. Earnings can be reported either on a 190 
per share basis or per 100 shares. For instance, the same firm can have the management forecast 191 
reported on a per share basis in the FQ database and per 100 shares in the I/B/E/S database.  To 192 
overcome the issue, we scale the earnings reported in each database by the share price reported 193 
for the same company in the same database. As the share price is reported on the same 194 
denomination as the earnings, this allows us to merge the data from different sources.   195 
We collect CG data from the Corporate Governance Evaluation System (CGES) developed 196 
by Nikkei Media Digital Inc. The advantage of CGES rather than alternative sources of CG 197 
data (such as ISS Risk Metrics) is that CGES has very good coverage of Japanese listed firms. 198 
In addition, CGES rates aspects of CG specific to Japan (e.g., cross shareholdings, dominant 199 
companies) and focuses on board structure and ownership which are important features in 200 
Japanese firms. Other papers using this CG data include Beekes et al. (2017) and Sakawa et al. 201 
(2012). 202 
 203 
3.2 Overall Sample 204 
The overall sample comprises firms in TSE First Section over the period 2006 to 2016. 205 
Approximately 1,300 firms per year are included in the sample (N=14,179), after the exclusion 206 
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of financial firms. Of these, 98% have one-year ahead management earnings forecasts.7 The 207 
overall sample is broken down into two subsamples for analysis: Sample 1, known as the 208 
Management Forecast (MF) sample, for modelling the effects of initial management forecasts 209 
[𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ] and initial consensus analyst forecasts [𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ] and Sample 2, also known as the 210 
Management Forecast Revision (MFR) sample, for the effects of analyst forecasts on 211 
management forecast revisions [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡].  212 
The initial MF sample, i.e., firms with management forecast data, contains 13,984 firm 213 
years (see Table 1, panel A). The final MF Sample of 3,911 firm years was obtained after the 214 
following exclusions: 660 firm years when the management forecast horizon exceeded 370 215 
days (to ensure the forecasts are for the next period’s earnings); 4,552 firm years when firms 216 
had missing analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S; 3,877 firm years when firms had fewer than 217 
three analysts contributing to consensus forecasts, 917 firm years when CG and management 218 
forecast data was missing, and 67 firms years where the AFD Reliance variable is in the 1st and 219 
99th percentile, to exclude outliers.8  220 
The MFR sample is obtained as follows. The final MF sample of 3,911 firm years is the 221 
starting point. From this we exclude observations where the MFR Reliance variable is in the 222 
1st and 99th percentile. This resulted in the omission of 551 firm years and the MFR sample 223 
with 3,360 firm year observations. Table 1 Panel B shows the breakdown of both samples by 224 
year. There are on average, 300 firms per year. 225 
 226 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 227 
                                                          
 
7 Also, as firms are required to provide regular updates to their forecasts on a timely basis when a certain threshold 
is breached, 84 percent of the firms that provide a management forecast also provide management forecast 
revisions. The firms in the First Section are the largest listed firms in Japan and hence there is good analyst 
coverage of the firms in our sample, with more than 60 percent of the firms covered by analysts in the I/B/E/S 
dataset. 




4 Research Method 229 
We employ SEM with measures of credibility as latent variables to test two distinct 230 
relations between management and analyst forecasts. The first encompasses the relation 231 
between initial management Earnings Per Share (EPS) forecasts and analyst initial EPS 232 
forecasts, moderated by management’s prior forecasting ability and CG. The second covers the 233 
relation between analyst forecast deviations (i.e., the difference between the initial 234 
management and analyst EPS forecasts) and management forecast revisions, moderated by 235 
analyst credibility.  236 
 237 
4.1 The Relation between Initial Management Forecasts and Analyst Forecasts 238 
First, we compute the level of reliance analysts place upon management’s initial forecasts 239 
in making their own forecasts. AFD Reliance is defined as follows:  240 
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  = – |𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡| 
 
(1) 
       241 
Where: MFt is the initial management EPS forecast for year t and AFt is the initial analyst 242 
consensus mean forecast EPS for year t. Table 2 provides detailed definitions for variables 243 
discussed in this section.9 244 
 245 
If the analysts rely entirely on the management forecast, 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 will take on the 246 
value of zero. However, if the consensus analyst forecast deviates from the management 247 
forecast, 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 will take on a more negative value. 248 
 249 
                                                          
 
9 Note that these forecasts are scaled by the relevant base price and hence account for any scaling issue due 
differences in the magnitude of the share prices. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 250 
 251 
We examine management credibility using a latent variable MF_CR. To measure the latent 252 
variable, we use observable variables based on managers’ prior forecasting history (Williams, 253 
1996, Graham et al., 2005) and observable proxies for good CG practice. Table 2, Panel B lists 254 
the definitions for these observable variables. Our first measure of management forecast 255 
credibility is previous forecast optimism. Optimism in forecasting is defined as an indicator 256 
variable equal to one if the management forecast error was positive, and zero otherwise. To 257 
measure the forecast optimism over the past five years (MF_Optimismt-5, t-1), we average the 258 
indicator variable for the years t-1 to t-5. The second measure is previous forecast accuracy. If 259 
managers have built a reputation for accurate reporting of performance, it is likely that current 260 
year management forecasts are perceived to be more credible (Hirst et al., 1999). We use the 261 
absolute value of Management Forecast Error (MFE) to estimate management forecast 262 
accuracy and take the average of the measure for the past five years, i.e., t-5 to t-1, to estimate 263 
MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1.10  264 
Our third measure of management forecast credibility is the previous year’s earnings 265 
surprise. We define the previous earnings surprise (MF_Surpriset-1) as the actual EPS for the 266 
year t-1 minus the last management EPS forecast for year t-1, deflated by the previous year’s 267 
base price. Our fourth measure is management forecast consistency. Following Hilary et al. 268 
(2014), we compare the variation in management and analysts’ consensus forecasts to compute 269 
consistency. MF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the standard 270 
deviation of MFEs from t-1 to t-5, was lower than the standard deviation of consensus Analyst 271 
Forecast Errors (AFE) from t-1 to t-5, and zero otherwise. AFE is measured as the mean 272 
                                                          
 
10 MFE is defined as the initial management forecast EPS for the year t [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡] less the actual EPS for the year t, 
scaled by the share price two days before the forecast announcement date. 
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consensus forecast EPS less the actual EPS. Our final measure relates to whether “bad news” 273 
is predicted by management. Hutton et al. (2003) conclude that bad news is more informative 274 
than good news. MF_Bad_Newst-1 is an indicator equal to one if the initial management forecast 275 
deflated by base price is below the prior month median consensus analyst forecast EPS deflated 276 
by base price, and zero otherwise.  277 
To measure CG, we use variables that reflect monitoring of management and the perception 278 
of management’s credibility. From prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002) and the TSE CG Code 279 
(TSE, 2015) we identify five major CG variables that are most likely to influence the credibility 280 
of the management: IDORTOt-1, FRGNt-1, CROSSt-1, ANTEIt-1, and WEBEVLt-1. All CG 281 
measures are measured at year t-1. Boards with more outside directors (IDORTOt-1) are shown 282 
to be associated with fewer instances of fraud and lower earnings management (Beasley, 1996; 283 
Klein, 2002). Ownership structures and corporate groupings are influential on firm behaviour 284 
in Japan, and by implication, can also influence perceptions of credibility. For example, we 285 
expect greater external monitoring when there is a more foreign ownership (FRGNt-1) of the 286 
firm. The existence of stable shareholders (ANTEIt-1) and cross-shareholdings (CROSSt-1) may 287 
reduce the impact of external monitoring, resulting in less accurate management disclosures.11 288 
We also include a disclosure score from CGES representing an evaluation of the company’s 289 
website (WEBEVLt-1), which is a proxy for the firm’s overall transparency. 290 
 291 
4.2 The Relation between Analyst Forecasts and Management Forecast Revisions 292 
                                                          
 
11 Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding in Japan have typically been the focus of prior studies on Japan. 
However ownership structures have been changing. Cross shareholdings and stable shareholdings have declined 
(Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008), providing the opportunity for greater foreign ownership in Japanese firms. 
14 
 
In the second model, we investigate whether the relationship between analyst forecast and 293 
subsequent management forecasts revisions are influenced by analyst credibility. To do so, we 294 
first compute 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡 as follows: 295 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡 = – |𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡| 
 
(2) 
       296 
Where: MFRt is the revised management EPS forecast in year t and AFt is the initial analyst 297 
consensus mean EPS forecast for year t. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 shows the amount of reliance that 298 
management places on the analyst consensus forecast when revising their forecasts. When the 299 
management relies entirely on the analyst consensus forecast, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 will take on the 300 
value of zero. However, if the revised management forecasts deviates from the analyst forecast, 301 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 will take on a more negative value. 302 
Table 2, Panel C lists the definitions of the observable variables used to measure the latent 303 
variable Analyst Credibility (AF_CR). Our first measure of analyst credibility is prior year’s 304 
analyst forecast accuracy (AF_ABSFEt-1) which is estimated as the absolute value of the 305 
forecast error for the prior year (t-1), deflated by the previous year’s base price.  More accurate 306 
analyst forecasts are expected to be associated with greater analyst credibility. Our second 307 
measure relates to the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, AF_Dispersiont-1, measured as the 308 
standard deviation in analyst forecasts at year-end of the prior fiscal year (t-1), and deflated by 309 
the previous year’s base price. Our third measure of analyst credibility is previous optimism, 310 
AF_Optimismt-1, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the prior year’s AFE is positive, 311 
and 0 otherwise. Forecasts which contain bias or are optimistic are likely to be perceived as 312 
less credible. Our fourth measure of analyst credibility is forecast consistency, 313 
AF_Consistencyt-5, t-1, measured by the standard deviation of AFE deflated by the base price 314 
over the past five years. More consistent forecasts are likely to be perceived as more credible. 315 
Our fifth measure of analyst credibility examines the percentage change in dispersion in 316 
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analysts’ forecasts following the release of the initial management forecast for year t-1 317 




     (3) 319 
Where: 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in the month prior to 320 
the first management forecast of the year t-1, and 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is the standard deviation of 321 
analyst forecasts in the month following the initial management forecast of the year t-1. We 322 
also include the mean number of analysts following the firm during the current year, 323 
ANA_Numbert. 324 
 325 
5 Results  326 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 327 
Table 3 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The 328 
mean of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is 5.7 while the mean of 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is 6.0 percent.12 This shows that even though both 329 
forecasts are fairly close in value, analysts are on average more optimistic than management in 330 
their forecasts. Correspondingly, AFD 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  has a mean of -0.9 percent, showing that 331 
analysts do not rely entirely on management when formulating their EPS forecasts.    332 
 333 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 334 
 335 
The variable MF_Optimismt-5,t-1 shows that, based on the past five years, management are, 336 
more often than not, pessimistic with their initial EPS forecasts (mean = 0.483 and median = 337 
0.4). MF_Accuracy,t-1 and MF_Surpriset-1 compare the initial and last management forecast 338 
                                                          
 
12 The forecasts are expressed as a percentage of the share price and allow comparison across firms. 
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EPS in year t-1 respectively, to the actual EPS in year t-1. MF_Accuracy,t-5,t-1 shows the average 339 
forecast accuracy based on the past five years. The mean of 2.7 percent suggests a relatively 340 
high error rate in the initial management forecast provided. The statistics show low levels of 341 
surprise, where the mean and median of MF_Surpriset-1 are both 0.1 percent. Consistent with 342 
prior research, our data suggests forecasting accuracy improves throughout the year.13 We also 343 
find management are more consistent in their forecasts than analysts. That is, the standard 344 
deviation of their forecast errors are smaller than the standard deviation of consensus analysts 345 
forecast errors. Last, in 64 percent of cases, the initial management forecast estimate is lower 346 
than the mean analyst forecast made in the month prior to initial management forecast.  347 
Table 3 Panel A also presents the descriptive statistics for the CG structure variables. We 348 
identified five CG variables that are most likely to influence the credibility of the management: 349 
IDORTOt-1, FRGNt-1, CROSSt-1, ANTEIt-1, and WEBEVLt-1. These variables show 350 
approximately one in ten directors are outside directors without experience in a controlling 351 
company, affiliated company or a main bank (IDORTOt-1). Less than a quarter (24%) of the 352 
stocks are foreign owned (FRGNt-1) and approximately 8% of shares are held by domestic 353 
companies with cross-shareholdings (CROSSt-1) relations. In addition, less than a third of the 354 
shares (31%) in our sample firms are held by stable shareholders (ANTEIt-1). 355 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used to examine the relation 356 
between analyst forecast and management forecast revisions. The mean value of the analyst 357 
forecast (AFt) is 5.9 percent and the mean value of the revised management forecast (MFRt) is 358 
5.3 percent. Comparing the statistics from Panel A, we observe that management are more 359 
likely to revise their forecast downwards, i.e., MFRt < MFt. Also, management are less likely 360 
                                                          
 
13 Note the other difference between the two measures is that we take the absolute of the difference between 
forecast and actual EPS when calculating MF_Accuracyt-1 and we use the signed value for MF_Surpriset-1. We 
made the conclusion based on comparing the maximum value of the two measures.  
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to rely on the analyst forecast when formulating their revised forecast than vice versa, i.e., 361 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 < 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡.  362 
For analyst credibility, the statistics show that analysts are on average more optimistic with 363 
their prior year forecasts (AF_Optimismt-1 proportion = 0.523). The mean AF_SDDropt-1 value 364 
of 0.048 suggests a decrease in the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in the month after 365 
the release of the management forecast, compared to the month after. The median of 0.169 366 
shows that for more than half of the firms, there is a decrease in the standard deviation of 367 
analyst forecasts after the release of the management forecast. This is consistent with the notion 368 
that management forecasts help to resolve uncertainty for analysts. The mean forecast accuracy 369 
(AF_ABSFEt-1) is 0.026, the mean forecast consistency (AF_Consistencyt) is 0.034, and the 370 
average analyst following (ANA_Numbert) is 9.63. 371 
Table 4 presents correlation matrices for the Management Forecast sample (Sample 1) and 372 
the Management Forecast Revision sample (Sample 2) in Panels A and B respectively. In Panel 373 
A we observe a strong correlation between MFt and AFt (ρ =0.91), suggesting that much of the 374 
information used in the management forecasts are reflected in the analyst forecast. We also 375 
observe significant correlations between AFD Reliancet and measures of management’s prior 376 
forecasting ability, and FRGNt-1. While 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  is negatively correlated with both 377 
MF_Accuracyt-1 and MF_Bad_Newst-1, it is positively correlated with MF_Supriset-1.  378 
In contrast to the strong correlation between MFt and AFt, the correlation between AFt and 379 
MFRt shown in Panel B is relatively weaker (ρ =0.735). MFR Reliancet is significantly 380 
negatively correlated with most of the measures of analyst credibility including AF_Optimismt-381 
1, AF_Dispersiont-1, AF_ABSFEt-1 and AF_Consistencyt-1.    382 
 383 




5.2 Effects of Management Forecasts on Analyst Forecasts 386 
Our first research question investigates the effects of management forecast credibility and 387 
CG on the relationship between management forecasts and analyst forecasts. The results are 388 
shown in Table 5 and Figure 1 which reproduces the STATA output from the SEM Builder. 389 
The numbers adjacent to the arrows in Figure 1 show the loading of the variables used for 390 
management credibility (CG variables and measures of prior forecast properties) on the latent 391 
variable (MF_CR). For example, the loading of MF_Optimism is -0.068, which is statistically 392 
significant (p = 0.002). The relationships (untabulated) between the underlying latent variable 393 
and all underlying variables for management credibility, except for MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1 and 394 
MF_BadNewst-1, are statistically significant at conventional levels. 395 
We use the following tests to examine the fit of our model: the likelihood ratio (χ2), Root 396 
Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the 397 
Standardized Room Mean Squared Residual (SRMR).14 Table 5, shows our model is a good fit 398 
in one of the four tests only (the SRMR test).  399 
The path coefficient between MF_CR and 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅t of 0.081 is significant at the 0.01 400 
level and infers that management credibility moderates the relationship between analyst and 401 
management forecasts. These results lend support to hypothesis H1, that is analysts place a 402 
greater reliance on the management forecasts when management are more credible.  403 
In further analysis, we recognise the inherent difficulties management faces in forecasting 404 
EPS by dividing the sample based on prior EPS volatility (high and low EPS volatility) to 405 
determine whether analyst reliance on management’s initial forecasts is affected by the 406 
difficulty in predicting EPS.15 Untabulated results show that, consistent with our expectations, 407 
                                                          
 
14 Hair et al. (2010) discuss the problems of using the χ2 statistic is assessing model fit in larger sample sizes. It is 
not unexpected that there is a statistically significant result for this test, given our sample size. 
15 EPS volatility is estimated using the standard deviation of the EPS for the previous five years.  
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when EPS uncertainty is higher, management credibility has a stronger effect on analyst 408 
reliance. 409 
 410 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 about here] 411 
 412 
5.3 Effects of Analyst Forecasts on Management Forecasts 413 
Our second research question investigates the existence and relative importance of analyst 414 
credibility on the relation between analyst forecasts and management forecast revisions. Table 415 
6 and Figure 4 present the results of the SEM with AF_CR as the latent variable and 416 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  as the outcome variable. The numbers adjacent to the arrows in Figure 2 show 417 
the loading of our indicator variables for analyst credibility on our latent variable (AF_CR). 418 
For example, the loading of AF_Optimismt-5,t-1 is -0.11 which is statistically significant at 419 
<0.001 level. All indicator variables for analyst credibility (except for ANA_Numbert) are 420 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 421 
Analysis of the goodness of fit statistics in Table 5 indicates only one of the four tests 422 
(SRMR) shows the model is a good fit. The path coefficient is 0.327, statistically significant at 423 
the 0.01 level, and hence support hypothesis H2 that analyst credibility moderates the relation 424 
between analyst and management forecasts. Further analysis indicates that EPS volatility does 425 
not affect this relationship, i.e., EPS uncertainty does not change analyst credibility’s 426 
moderating role.  427 
 428 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 about here] 429 
 430 
 431 
6 Additional Results  432 
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6.1 Industry and year effects 433 
In additional analysis, we address the concern that our measures, AFD Reliance and MFR 434 
Reliance, do not capture the reliance that analyst (management) place on the management 435 
(analyst) forecasts, and that management and analysts may be reacting to the same industry 436 
events. To do so, we adjust MFt, AFt and MFRt by the industry and year median to remove 437 
these effects. 16 The summary statistics (untabulated) show the means of the adjusted MF and 438 
AF measures are, by construction, close to zero (i.e., -0.2 and -0.3 percent, respectively). We 439 
present the results for the SEMs in Table 5 Panel B and Table 6 Panel B. As shown in the 440 
tables, the results are consistent with those using unadjusted measures. That is, management 441 
credibility (MF_CR) moderates the reliance that analysts place on management forecasts. 442 
Similarly, analyst credibility (AF_CR) has the same moderating effect on the reliance that 443 
management place on analysts’ consensus forecasts. 444 
 445 
6.2 Alternative specification of the MF_CR latent variable 446 
In the SEM analysis (see Table 5), we use observable variables such as management forecast 447 
accuracy in prior years and five corporate governance proxies to measure the latent variable 448 
capturing management credibility, MF_CR. In additional analysis, we include other CG 449 
variables to measure the latent variable. Firms with smaller boards (BRD_NUMt-1) and board 450 
committees (FLG_COMMt-1) may also be associated with more effective monitoring.17 In 451 
                                                          
 
16 We were unable to source Global Industrial Classification Standard data for all of our sample and the Nikkei 
industry classifications were too finely partitioned. Therefore, we create our own industry classifications based 
upon the Nikkei data, The 13 industry segments in this study are created from the 36 Nikkei Industry Medium 
Level segments by merging related segments. Further details available on request available from the 
corresponding author. 
17 Whilst board committees are common features of CG in other countries (e.g., UK, USA), they are less common 
in Japan. In traditional Japanese CG, there is a two-board structure comprising the board of directors and the board 
of corporate auditors. However since 2003, companies in Japan have been given the option of adopting an Anglo-
American style of CG to include board committees (audit, nomination and remuneration committees). 
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addition, we include several other measures of ownership: institutional (INSTt-1), influential 452 
(NFLOATt-1), management (ENTt-1), and dominant shareholders (DOMIt-1). Untabulated results 453 
show the relation between MF_CR and AFD_Reliance is positive but not statistically 454 
significant at the conventional levels. This shows the results from the SEM analysis are 455 
sensitive to the model specification.  456 
 457 
6.3 Mediating effects (Registered Protocol)18 458 
The analysis conducted thus far assumes credibility plays a moderating role in the relation 459 
between management and analyst forecasts. However, credibility can also take on a mediating 460 
role. 19  This happens when an independent variable’s effect on a dependent variable is 461 
transmitted through the mediator. In path analysis language, mediation is the indirect effect on 462 
an independent variable of a dependent variable that goes through a mediator variable, which 463 
in this case is credibility.  464 
 465 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 466 
 467 
Definitions for the variables used in this part of the paper are shown in Table 7. In this 468 
analysis, we examine the relation between Management Forecast Innovation [MFIt] and 469 
Analyst Forecast Innovation [AFIt]. MFIt is defined as the initial management forecast EPS for 470 
the year (t) less the actual EPS for the prior year (t-1), deflated by the share price two days 471 
                                                          
 
18 This paper is part of the Ball and Brown (1968) Virtual Special Issue which features papers that followed a pre-
registered design process. Research in these papers was conducted over three phases. In Phase I, each team 
prepared a written pitch based on Faff’s (2015, 2018) “Pitching Research” framework to register for the project. 
Then in Phase II, after further review, the study’s design was locked in. The analysis presented in this section of 
our study is based on the research design proposed in the Phase II protocol document. At the request of the 
reviewer in a subsequent review, i.e. Phase III, we adopted the research design presented in the main section of 
the paper. 




before the forecast announcement date. AFIt is defined as the initial analyst consensus mean 472 
forecast EPS for the year less the actual EPS for the prior year (t-1) deflated by the share price 473 
two days before the forecast announcement date. We examine the indirect effects of 474 
management forecasts on analyst forecasts through the latent variables for management 475 
credibility, MF_CR (as previously defined). The analysis is conducted in a manner similar to 476 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) and Hilary et al. (2016). The direct and indirect paths through the 477 
latent variables in our model are indicated by the path arrows in Figure 3. There is a direct path 478 
between MFIt and AFIt, and a direct path between MF_CR and AFI. An indirect path exists 479 
between MFIt and AFIt via MF_CR. Table 8 presents the results of the SEM with MFIt as the 480 
source variable, AFIt as the outcome variable, and MF_CR as the latent variable.  481 
 482 
 [Insert Figure 3 and Table 8 about here] 483 
 484 
The ratio of the direct path coefficient (1.001) to the total effect (0.9498) is the portion of 485 
the correlation between MFIt and AFIt that is attributable to the direct path. The mediated or 486 
indirect path (-0.0509) is the product of the path coefficient between MFIt and MF_CR  487 
(-0.8384), and the path coefficient between MF_CR and AFIt (0.0607). The ratio of the 488 
mediated path to the total effect captures the proportion of the correlation between MFIt and 489 
AFIt that is attributable to the mediated effect. While the direct effect of management forecast 490 
on analyst forecast is strong, the insignificant indirect effect suggests management forecast 491 
credibility does not mediate the effect of management’s initial forecast innovation on analyst 492 
forecasts. 493 
In the next part of our analysis, we examine the relation between analyst forecast deviation 494 
[AFDt] and management forecast revision update [MFRUt]. AFDt is the initial analyst 495 
consensus mean forecast EPS for year (t) less the initial management forecast for the year (t), 496 
23 
 
deflated by the share price two days before the forecast announcement date. MFRUt is defined 497 
as the revised management forecast EPS for the year (t) less the initial management forecast 498 
EPS for the year (t), deflated by the share price two days before the forecast announcement 499 
date. We examine whether the relation between analyst forecast deviation and management 500 
forecast revisions are affected by analysts’ credibility [AF_CR]. AF_CR is as previously 501 
defined. 502 
Figure 4 presents the path diagram showing the direct and indirect paths between analyst 503 
forecast deviation and management forecast revisions. We expect a direct path between AFDt 504 
and MFRUt, and an indirect path which works through AF_CR. Table 9 shows the results of 505 
the SEM with AFDt as the source variable, MFRUt as the outcome variable, and AF_CR as the 506 
latent variable. The ratio of the direct path coefficient (0.1169) to the total effect (0.1146) is 507 
the portion of the correlation between AFDt and MFRUt that is attributable to the direct path. 508 
The mediated or indirect path (-0.0023) is the product of the path coefficient between AFDt 509 
and AF_CR (-0.0228), and the path coefficient between AF_CR and MFRUt (0.0996). The ratio 510 
of the mediated path to the total effect captures the proportion of the correlation between AFDt 511 
and MFRt that is attributable to the mediated effect. The direct effect of analyst forecast 512 
deviation on management forecast revisions is strong, however we do not find evidence to 513 
support the notion that analyst credibility mediates the effect of analyst forecast on 514 
management forecast revisions. 515 
 516 
 517 
 [Insert Figure 4 and Table 9 about here] 518 
 519 
7 Conclusions 520 
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We use SEM to investigate key relationships between management and analysts’ forecasts 521 
to determine whether there is a moderating role for credibility. SEM is relatively unexplored 522 
in this literature to date, but is a powerful method to model latent variables such as credibility. 523 
We model the relation between management and analyst forecasts in a SEM framework and 524 
include management credibility and analyst credibility separately as moderating factors. We 525 
chose to study Japanese firms as management forecasts are effectively mandatory in Japan. 526 
This omits the selection bias apparent in other countries (e.g., US) where managers have a 527 
choice about whether to disclose forecasts. In addition, where management’s expectations 528 
change, the management’s forecasts must be revised on a timely basis, providing a rich history 529 
of management forecast data. 530 
We investigate whether the relation between management forecasts and analyst forecasts 531 
is moderated by credibility in TSE listed First Section firms between 2006 and 2016. Two 532 
distinct aspects of this relation are examined. With the first, our results show that management 533 
credibility (proxied by prior forecasting ability and firm’s CG) influences the reliance analysts 534 
place upon information in management’s initial forecast in making their own EPS forecasts. 535 
Additional results show that management’s initial forecast has only a direct effect on analysts’ 536 
forecasts.  537 
In the second aspect of this relation, the moderating effect of analyst credibility on the 538 
relation between analyst forecasts and management forecast revisions is examined. We show 539 
that management’s reliance on analyst forecasts is determined by how credible analyst 540 
forecasts have been historically. The SEM analysis shows analyst credibility has a moderating 541 
effect on the relation. Where analysts are perceived to be more credible, managers exhibit 542 
reliance upon information in analysts’ consensus forecasts in making their own forecast.  543 
Our findings put the focus on credibility in better understanding the relationship between 544 
management and analyst forecasts. Each party’s reliance on the other’s forecast is influenced 545 
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by historical forecasting ability and in the case of analysts, also by the corporate governance 546 
mechanisms within the firm. The implication is the importance of reputation building and 547 
reputation maintenance by both management and analysts in the forecasting environment. 548 
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Note: Rectangles represent observed variables and ellipse indicates a latent (unobserved) variable.  Error terms are indicated in circles and variances are indicated 
next to each error term. There are ten observable variables which contribute to the latent variable management credibility (MF_CR): These are MF_Optimismt-
5.t-1, MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1, MF_Surpriset-1, MF_Consistencyt-5,t-1, MF_Bad_Newst-1, IDORTOt-1, FRGNt-1, CROSSt-1, ANTEIt-1, and WEBEVELt-1. The numbers 
adjacent to the arrows leading from the latent variable show the loading of variables on the latent variable (MF_CR).  The numbers in the rectangles 
[observed variables] represent the constant term in the SEM estimation for the observable variable. Source: STATA SEM Builder Output. Variables 









Note: Rectangles represent observed variables and ellipse indicates a latent (unobserved) variable.  Error terms are indicated in circles. There are six observable 
variables which contribute to the latent variable analyst credibility (AF_CR). These are AF_Optimismt-1, AF_Dispersiont-1, AF_SDDropt-1, AF_ABSFEt-1, 
AF_Constistencyt-5,t-1 and ANA_Numbert. The numbers adjacent to the arrows leading from the latent variable show the loading of variables on the 
latent variable (AF_CR). The numbers in the rectangles [observed variables] represent the constant term in the SEM estimation for the observable 




Path Diagram Showing Direct and Indirect Paths between Management Forecast 




Note: Rectangles represent observed variables and ellipses represent latent (unobserved) variables. 
Latent variables are measured by multiple observed variables, as discussed in section 4.1. Direct 
effects are indicated by a solid line arrow and indirect effects are indicated by a dashed line arrow. 
Variables are defined in Table 7. 
  
MFIt AFIt 








Path Diagram Showing Direct and Indirect Paths between Analyst Forecast Deviation and 
Management Forecast Revisions 
 
 
Note: Rectangles represent observed variables and ellipse indicates a latent (unobserved) variable. 
Latent variables will be measured by multiple observed variables, as discussed in section 4.2. Direct 
effects are indicated by a solid line arrow and indirect effects are indicated by a dashed line arrow. 
Variables are defined in Table 7. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Overall Sample Selection  
  No. of firm years 
Number of firm year observations issuing management forecast 
of EPS from 2006 to 2016  13,984 
Less:   
(a) Management forecast horizon > 370 days 660 13,324 
(b) Firms with missing analyst forecast data on I/B/E/S 4,552 8,772 
(c) Firms with fewer than 3 analysts contributing to 
consensus forecasts 
3,877 4,895 
(d) Firms with missing CG and MF related data  917 3,978 
(e) Outliers where AFD Reliance is in 1% and 99% 
percentile 
67 3,911 
     
Management Forecast [MF] Sample (for modelling the effects 
of MFt on AFt  
 3,911 
Less:   
      Outliers where MFR Reliance is in 1% and 99% percentile  551  
    
Management Forecast Revision [MFR] Sample for modelling 




Panel B: Sample size by year 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
MF Sample  323 377 396 369 369 378 392 367 320 332 288 3,911 










Panel A: Management and Analyst Forecast Variables 
Variable Label Definition 
AFt Analyst Forecast defined as the initial analyst (based on consensus mean) 
forecast EPS for the year (t) deflated by the share price two days before the 
announcement date.  
MFt Management Forecast defined as the initial management forecast EPS for 
the year (t) deflated by the share price two days before the announcement 
date.  
AFD Reliancet AFD Reliance is defined as  – |𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀|.  
 
MFRt  MFR is defined as the revised management forecast EPS for the year (t) 
deflated by the base price (share price two days before the announcement 
date).  
MFR Reliancet MFR Reliance is defined as –  |𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀|.  
 
 
Panel B: Latent Variable: Management Forecast Credibility (MF_CR) 
Variable Label Definition 
MF_Optimismt-5,t-1 Average of the following indicator variable for the past five years (t-5 to t-
1). For year t, the indicator variable is set equal to 1 if the Management 
Forecast Error (MFE) was positive; 0 otherwise. MFE is defined as the 
initial management forecast EPS for the year t less the actual EPS for the 
year t, deflated by the share price two days before the forecast announcement 
date. 
MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1 Average of the absolute value of the MFE for the past five years (t-5 to t-1).  
MF_Surpriset-1 Actual EPS for year t-1 minus the final management forecast for EPS for 
year t-1, deflated by the share price two days before the forecast 
announcement date. 
MF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the standard deviation of the MFE (from t-1 
to t-5) is less than the standard deviation of the consensus Analyst Forecast 
Error (AFE) (from t-1 to t-5), 0 otherwise. AFE defined as the mean 
consensus analyst forecast EPS less actual EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, 
deflated by the share price two days before the analyst forecast 
announcement date. (Source: Hilary et al., 2014) 
MF_Bad_Newst-1 Indicator variable equal to 1 if initial management forecast EPS estimate for 
year t-1 is below previous month’s analyst median consensus EPS; 0 
otherwise. (Source: Hutton et al., 2003) 
IDORTOt-1 Percentage of outside directors (i.e. without job experience in banks, 
controlling companies, affiliated companies and main banks)  
FRGNt-1 Percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders 
CROSSt-1 Percentage of shares held by domestic companies with cross-shareholding 
relations 
ANTEIt-1  Percentage of shares held by stable shareholders 
WEBEVLt-1 Total evaluation score of company website from the ease to understand, ease 
of use, and information quantity, sourced from Nikko IR co. The range is 
from 0 to 100. Higher scores indicate higher disclosure quality. 
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Panel C: Latent Variable: Analyst Credibility (AF_CR) 
Variable Label Definition 
AF_ABSFEt-1 Absolute value of AFE for year t-1.  
AF_Dispersiont-1 Standard deviation of analyst forecasts for year t-1. 
AF_Optimismt-1 Indicator variable equal to 1 if AFE for year t-1 was positive; 0 otherwise.  
AF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 Standard deviation of AFE over the past five years. 
AF_SDDropt-1 Standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month prior to initial management 
forecast in year t-1 minus standard deviation in analyst forecast in month 
following initial management forecast in year t-1, scaled by standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts in month prior to initial management forecast  
ANA_Numbert Number of analysts following the firm. We take the average number of 






Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Management Forecast Sample (N=3,911) 
 Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
MFt 0.057  0.034  -0.414  0.042  0.056  0.072  0.226  
AFt 0.060  0.033  -0.338  0.046  0.060  0.075  0.220  
AFD Reliancet  -0.009  0.011  -0.118  -0.012  -0.006  -0.003  0.000  
        
MF_Optimismt-5,t-1 0.483  0.244  0.000  0.400  0.400  0.600  1.000  
MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1 0.027  0.030  0.001  0.010  0.018  0.032  0.412  
MF_Surpriset-1 0.001  0.014  -0.235  -0.001  0.001  0.005  0.092  
MF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 0.601  0.490  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
MF_Bad_Newst-1 0.638  0.481  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
        
IDORTOt-1 9.805  12.198  0.000  0.000  6.667  16.667  85.714  
FRGNt-1 24.100  11.611  0.810  15.890  22.760  30.700  76.020  
CROSSt-1 7.701  7.346  0.000  1.380  6.050  11.560  45.000  
ANTEIt-1 30.855  14.815  0.540  19.310  27.980  40.710  75.350  
WEBEVLt-1 58.940  9.514  33.400  52.000  58.000  65.000  92.900  
 
Panel B: Management Forecast Revision Sample (N=3,360) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
AFt  0.059  0.034  -0.323  0.046  0.059  0.075  0.220  
MFRt  0.053  0.045  -0.559  0.039  0.055  0.072  0.360  
MFR Reliancet -0.017  0.026  -0.303  -0.020  -0.010  -0.004  0.000  
        
AF_Optimismt-1 0.531  0.499  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
AF_Dispersiont-1 0.009  0.009  0.000  0.003  0.006  0.010  0.132  
AF_SDDropt-1 0.048  0.938  -31.667  -0.085  0.169  0.405  1.000  
AF_ABSFEt-1 0.026  0.040  0.000  0.005  0.013  0.029  0.396  
AF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 0.034  0.042  0.001  0.011  0.021  0.042  0.704  
ANA_Numbert 9.626  4.851  3.000  5.583  8.667  13.083  28.250  
 






Correlation between Variables 
 
Panel A: Management Forecast Sample (N = 3,911) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10 11 12 
1 MFt 1            
2 AFt 0.9142* 1           
3 AFD Reliancet 0.1296* 0.0411* 1          
4 MF_Optimismt-5,t-1 -0.1084* -0.1298* -0.0296 1         
5 MF_Accuracyt-5,t-1 0.0476* 0.0652* -0.2560* 0.1965* 1        
6 MF_Surpriset-1 0.1040* 0.0999* 0.0452* -0.1596* -0.0366* 1       
7 MF_Consistencyt-5,t-1 -0.0096 -0.0063 -0.0158 0.0031 0.0198 0.0046 1      
8 MF_Bad_Newst-1 -0.1417* 0.0517* -0.0610* -0.0558* -0.0375* -0.0590* -0.0098 1     
9 IDORTOt-1 0.0031 0.0043 0.0079 -0.0014 0.0597* -0.0041 0.0185 0.0335* 1    
10 FRGNt-1 0.0531* 0.0480* 0.0986* -0.1174* -0.0595* 0.0334* 0.0352* 0.0156 0.2712* 1   
11 CROSSt-1 -0.0064 -0.0074 -0.017 -0.0525* -0.0137 -0.0077 -0.0001 -0.0235 -0.1180* -0.1731* 1  
12 ANTEIt-1 0.0121 0.0043 0.0182 -0.0624* -0.0963* -0.0206 -0.026 0.001 -0.1831* -0.4320* 0.0763* 1 






Panel B: Management Forecast Revision Sample (N=3,360) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 AFt  1        
2 MFRt  0.7351* 1       
3 MFR Reliancet 0.0305 0.3615* 1      
4 AF_Optimismt-1 -0.1572* -0.2022* -0.1264* 1     
5 AF_Dispersiont-1 -0.0034 -0.0391* -0.1618* 0.016 1    
6 AF_SDDropt-1 -0.0114 -0.0129 -0.0003 0.012 -0.0945* 1   
7 AF_ABSFEt-1 -0.3161* -0.2689* -0.2457* 0.1900* 0.3676* -0.0397* 1  
8 AF_Consistency t-5,t-1 0.0546* -0.0265 -0.2165* -0.0084 0.4493* -0.0187 0.4268* 1 
9 ANA_Numbert 0.0141 0.0286 0.0324 -0.0417* 0.0216 0.0788* -0.0138 -0.0146 




Standardised Effects of Management Credibility on the Relationship between 
Management Forecasts and Analyst Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Relationship between MF and AF measured by AFD Reliance  
Outcome Coefficient  
AFD Reliance   
 MF_CR --> AFD Reliance 0.0806***  
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 1083.67***  
 RMSEA 0.078  
 AIC 95328.978  
 CFI 0.587  
 SRMR 0.056  
 No. of obs. 3,911  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Panel B: Relationship between MF Adjusted and AF Adjusted measured by AFD Reliance 
Adjusted 
Outcome Coefficient  
AFD Reliance   
 MF_CR --> AFD Reliance Adjusted 0.0792***  
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 1043.57***  
 RMSEA 0.076  
 AIC 95076.239  
 CFI 0.597  
 SRMR 0.055  
 No. of obs. 3,911  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 
 





Standardised Effects of Analyst Credibility on the Relationship between Analyst 
Forecast Deviation and Management Forecast Revisions 
 
Panel A: Relationship between MFR and AF measured by MFR Reliance  
Outcome Coefficient 
MFR Reliance   
 AF_CR -->MFR Reliance 0.3266***  
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 252.83***  
 RMSEA 0.071  
 AIC -28296  
 CFI 0.887  
 SRMR 0.038  
 No of obs. 3,360  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Panel B: Relationship between MFR Adjusted and AF Adjusted measured by MFR Reliance 
Adjusted 
Outcome Coefficient 
MFR Reliance   
 AF_CR -->MFR Reliance 0.3062***  
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 245.04***  
 RMSEA 0.070  
 AIC -28624  
 CFI 0.888  
 SRMR 0.037  
 No of obs. 3,360  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 





Management and Analyst Forecast Variable Definitions for Mediating Effects Analysis 
 
AFIt  Analyst Forecast Innovation defined as the initial analyst (based on 
consensus mean) forecast EPS for the year (t) less the actual EPS for the 
prior year (t-1), deflated by the share price two days before the forecast 
announcement date.  
AFDt  Analysts Forecast Deviation defined as the initial analyst (based on 
consensus mean) forecast EPS for the year (t) less the initial management 
forecast EPS for the year (t), deflated by the share price two days before the 
forecast announcement date.  
MFIt  Management Forecast Innovation defined as the initial management forecast 
EPS for the year (t) less the actual EPS for the prior year (t-1), deflated by 
the share price two days before the forecast announcement date.  
MFRUt  Management Forecast Revision Update is defined as the revised 
management forecast EPS for the year (t) less the initial management 
forecast EPS for the year (t), deflated by the share price two days before the 








Standardised Effects of Management Forecasts on Analyst Forecast Innovations 
 
 
Unadjusted AFI and MFI 
Outcome Path Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
AFIt     
 (1) MF_CR --> AFIt 0.0607   
 (2) MFIt --> AFIt 1.001***   
MF_CR     
 (3) MFIt --> MF_CR -0.8384***   
     
 
(4) MFIt --> AFIt  




(5) MFIt --> AFIt 
       =(2) + (4)   0.9498*** 
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 2762.33*** 
 RMSEA 0.115 
 AIC 122,362 
 CFI 0.789  
 SRMR 0.080 
 N 3,889 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 






Standardised Effects of Analyst Forecast Deviation on Management Forecast Revisions 
 
Unadjusted MFRU and AFD 
Outcome Path Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
MFRUt     
 (1)AF_CR --> MFRUt 0.0996***   
 (2)AFD --> MFRUt 0.1169***   
     
AF_CR     
 (3)AFDt --> AF_CR -0.0228   
 
(4) AFDt --> MFRUt 
  (1) × (3)  -0.0023  
     
 
(5) AFDt -> MFRUt 
      (2) + (4)   0.1146*** 
Fit Statistics Likelihood ratio (χ2) 374.13*** 
 RMSEA 0.075 
 AIC -47,940 
 CFI 0.822 
 SRMR 0.041 
 N 3,326 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001 
 
Note: Variables are defined in Table 7. 
 
 
